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This paper examines how social security reform and childcare support affect fertility and 
social welfare, based on a simple overlapping generations model with endogenous fertility.  
In an open economy with no altruism, introducing a childcare subsidy is the second-best 
solution under an aging population.  However, in a closed economy and/or assuming the 
household’s altruistic bequests, childcare support is not necessarily desirable and the case 
that curtailing a pay-as-you-go social security system reduces social welfare cannot be ruled 
out.  In addition, we show that social security reform and childcare have different effects on 
the transition process to a new steady state. 
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 1.  Introduction 
 
Population is aging rapidly in almost every industrialized country.  This demographic 
trend has placed strong pressures on the financial viability of the social security (hereafter 
referred to as SS) system, since its benefits to retired generations depend heavily on 
working and future generations.  In most countries, the total fertility rate (TFR) remains well 
below the level that can sustain the current population size and there is a growing risk that 
the  financial positions of the public pension will deteriorate and inequality between 
generations will continue to widen.  Many economists propose to shift to a funded system 
from a pay-as-you-go one, or  privatize the system along with introduction of mandatory 
individual accounts (e.g. Feldstein (1999)).  Any SS reform should accompany a reduction 
of benefits and contributions and curtail intergenerational income transfer, which will 
become more difficult to sustain under an aging population
1. 
Another way to strengthen the SS system against demographic pressures would be 
to provide households with financial childcare support, because children are expected to 
play a key role in financing SS benefits in the future.  A sustained downtrend of fertility in 
many countries is attributable largely to the higher opportunity cost of childcare, presumably 
reflecting a rise in the labor force participation by highly educated women.  Thus, in recent 
decades, policymakers in industrialized  countries have been giving more importance to 
childcare support, including family and child allowance, maternity and childcare leave, and 
various tax incentives for childcare.  Especially in Japan, which belongs to the group with 
the  lowest fertility in OECD member countries and whose benefits to the  “family and 
children” have a quite limited share of total social policy benefits, many argue for a shifting of 
                                                 
1  In this paper, we do not discuss other important roles of social security, such as to provide the elderly with 
the “national minimum” and to reduce uncertainty about future income.   3
benefits to childcare from income support for the elderly
2. 
It is, however, uncertain whether and to what extent childcare support is effective in 
improving fertility.  Fertility depends heavily on various factors such as immigration, 
people’s attitude toward marriage and family, and other social/cultural/religious backgrounds, 
and it takes at least a couple of decades for childcare support to have any impact.  If that is 
the case, it should be more reasonable and desirable to make SS less exposed to 
demographic pressures; that is, to lower a magnitude of income transfer between 
generations. 
This paper aims to investigate how much SS reform and childcare support affects 
fertility and social  welfare, based on a simple overlapping generations model with 
endogenous fertility.  There is extensive literature on endogenous fertility in the context with 
human capital and endogenous growth theory.  Among others, seminal works by Becker 
and Barro (1988) and Barro and Becker (1989) analyze how fertility is endogenously 
determined in small open and closed economies, respectively, assuming dynamic utility 
maximization by altruistic household.  Becker, Murphy, and Tamura (1990), which is 
another noted study on economic growth with endogenous fertility, showed a negative 
correlation between fertility and scale of human capital.  Nishimura and Zhang (1992), Kato 
(1999), and Oshio (2001) provide recent examples of studies on the relation between social 
security and fertility.  However, much remains to be analyzed about the effectiveness of SS 
reform and childcare support in terms of fertility, as well as social welfare. 
Intuitively, childcare support appears to be a favorable policy option, since it is 
expected to be able to raise fertility and mitigate the distorting impact of SS on resource 
allocation under an aging population.  This second-best argument seems to make sense in 
                                                 
2 In Japan, the TFR was as low as 1.34 in 2001, and the share of benefits to the “Family and Children” of 
total SS benefits was 2.7% (compared to 9.0% in Germany (1996) and 10.5% in Sweden) according to 
ILO’s “Cost of Social Security 1994-96: Nineteenth International Inquiry.”   4
an open economy with no altruistic income transfer between generations, although the best 
policy option should be to reduce a size of the pay-as-you-go SS system.  In a closed 
economy, however, the story becomes much more complicated because the policy impact 
on capital accumulation should be taken into account; childcare support might reduce the 
pace of per-capita capital  accumulation in the long-run due to a greater number of 
descendants.  Moreover, altruistic bequests, which are expected to at least partly offset 
public income transfer between generations, would likely make it more difficult to predict the 
direction of the policy impact.  In addition, the well-known “double burden” problem that 
occurs during the transition to a funded SS system implies that it is important to analyze 
what the transition process to a new steady state looks like. 
Section 2 sets up the basic model, starting with an open economy and no altruism, 
and examines a combination of SS and childcare support and its effectiveness.  Then, it 
moves to a closed economy and takes a household’s altruistic behavior into account, to 
investigate whether or not the second-best story continues to hold.  Section 3 presents 
some simple simulations to compare the steady states before and after the policy changes.  
It also gives a rough picture of the transition process to the new steady state as well as the 
intergenerational distribution of the policy impact.  Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
 
2.1 The basic model in an open small economy 
 
Let us consider a simple overlapping generations model of two periods (working and 
retirement periods) and two generations (working and retirement generations) in an open 
small economy.  Also assume that the working generation consists of  m symmetric   5
households, whose utility functions and budget constraints are identical.  Each household 
consumes c1 and c2, in each period, respectively, and it bears and cares for n children in 
the working period.  Since we consider a household in individual terms, the size of the 
population remains unchanged if n is equal to unity, grows (shrinks) if n is greater (less) than 
unity.  So n-1 can be interpreted as the rate of population growth rate per generation, and 
2n corresponds to TFR.  We assume that the household’s utility is determined solely  by 
levels of consumption in each period and number of children, not by the children’s “quality” 
such as the education with which they are endowed
3. 
For simplicity, we assume that a representative household has a Cobb-Douglas utility 
function such as 
. 1 , , 0 , 1 , ln ln ln 2 1 < < = + + + + = g b a g b a g b a c c n u †††      
(1) 
At this point, we assume that the household cares only about its own utility and leaves no 
bequests.  Denote w, r, and z as wage, interest rate, and cost of childcare per child, and 
assume that the household takes these variables as exogenously given.  Now let us 
consider two social policy measures.  First, the government levies the SS tax,  p, per 
household on the young generation, and gives SS benefit to the old generation which has 
retired.  Under a pay-as-you-go system, total SS benefits are set to be equal to total SS tax 
revenues in each period.  Second, the government gives the childcare subsidy, s, for each 
child, and finances it by levying the childcare tax on the working generation.  All the SS 
benefit/ tax and childcare subsidy/tax are lump-sum. 
The household determines consumption levels at each period and the number of 
children to maximize its utility, given the average number of children,  n , of the other 
                                                 
3  In this respect, see Becker and Tomes (1976) and Cigno (1991) for example.   6
households in the economy.  Then, the budget constraint of the household is given by 

























+ + -              (2) 
Since the households live in an open economy, capital accumulation is neglected and both 
w and r are assumed to be constant.  The first term on the left hand side of (2) shows the 
net childcare cost, which is reduced by the childcare subsidy.  The third term on the right 
hand side is the present discount value of the SS benefit received after retirement, with the 
coefficient on p – which is the same as that on s – being the average number of children per 
household.  The last term shows the size of the lump-sum tax to finance the childcare 
subsidy.  The larger the number of children, the more SS benefit the household receives in 
the retirement period and the more SS benefit and the more childcare tax it pays in the 
working period. 




















+ + -                              (3) 
where the household assumes that the number of its own children does not affect the levels 
of SS benefit and childcare tax.  This condensed budget constraint also shows that the 
average number of children of other  households affects each household’s budget in 
opposite ways: more children of other  households increase  each household’s lifetime 
disposable income through the SS benefit on the one hand; and, they reduce it through the 
childcare tax on the other.  In this sense, children are “public goods” that have both positive 
and negative externalities. 
The optimal number of children for each household, given the number of children of 

























which maximizes utility (2) under the budget constraint (3).  Since households are assumed 
to be symmetric, the average number of children per household in this economy is given by 
a Nash equilibrium such that 
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which is obtained assuming that  n n =  and that 









a                                                    (5) 
to make sure that the number of children is positive.  This inequality (5) indicates the 
condition that the gross cost of childcare, z, is greater than the weighted average of two 
kinds of social burden related to childcare per child; that is, the childcare subsidy, s, and 
the present discount value of the SS benefit, p/(1+r). 
     The optimal levels of consumption are also given by 
           ( )( )
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in the working and retirement periods, respectively.  Plugging (4) and (6) into (1) yields the 
household’s indirect utility function, denoted as v, which is given by 
    ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ., 1 1 ln 1 ln ln 1 ln const r p s z r s z p w v + + - - - - + + - - + - = a a g a    (7)                                                                         
with w, r, p, and s being exogenously given. 
 
2.2 The second-best combination of social security and childcare subsidy   8
 
In this section we consider the role of SS reform, childcare subsidy, and their 
combination for social welfare in an open economy.  Differentiating (7) with respect to p and 
s, together with (4), we obtain 
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Here, two things should be noted.  First, we reconfirm from (8-1) the well-known threshold 
for the efficiency of a pay-as-you-go SS system: if the population growth rate, n-1, is higher 
(lower) than the interest rate, r, then SS is efficient (inefficient).  In addition, since  n is 
endogenously solved by (4), we get 
( ) ( )( )
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This implies that as far as   
         ( ) w z r a > + 1                                                        (9) 
and there is no or limited childcare subsidy, the population growth rate is lower than the 
interest rate and thus SS reduces the household’s utility.  At the same time, however, we 
cannot rule out the case that the childcare subsidy more than offsets the negative impact of 
SS on social welfare. 
Second, we recognize from (8-2) that a childcare subsidy cannot be justified unless 
there is a pay-as-you-go SS system (or other systems that accompany income transfer to 
the elderly from the young).  If there is no SS, children cannot be “public goods” that have 
positive externalities in this model, thus the childcare subsidy that aims to increase the 
number of children is not needed or rather should be avoided.  If there is any SS, the   9
household’s utility is maximized when 
( ). 1 r p s + =                                                        (10) 
This complementary relationship between SS and childcare subsidy can be 
explained in another way.   That is, we can show that the  privately optimal number of 
children is smaller than its socially optimal level in a SS-rich economy, whereas it is larger in 
a childcare-support-rich economy.  The socially optimal number of children, denoted as n
*, 




















where we assume that  n n =  in (3), and take into account the relationship that the 
childcare subsidy and  tax are to be completely balanced in the government budget.  A 
simple calculation yields the socially optimal number of children, n
*, which is given by 
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,                                                  (11) 
assuming that  ( ) r p z + > 1 .  Comparing this with the privately optimal number of children 
given by (4) leads to 
           ( ) ( ). 1 , 1
* * r p s if n n r p s if n n + > > + < <  
These inequalities tell us that the number of children tends to be smaller than socially 
optimal if SS is richer than childcare support, whereas it tends to be larger than socially 
optimal if childcare support is richer than SS.  Under a pay-as-you-go SS scheme, the 
socially and privately optimal number of children are identical if and only if (10) holds. 
It is widely known that a pay-as-you-go SS scheme is not neutral regarding the 
household’s utility maximization.  However, its distorting effect can be offset by another 
distorting policy, that is, the childcare subsidy.  This is a typical second-best situation, but at 
the same time the second-best policy combination cannot be the best by definition.  We   10
discuss this more in detail in the next subsection.   
 
2.3 The limited effectiveness of the policy combination 
 
Discussions in the previous subsection suggest that the government can subdue the 
distorting effect of SS on social welfare by introducing a childcare subsidy.  However, this 
does not mean that SS, even if accompanied by a childcare subsidy, can be justified in 
terms of social welfare.  In an aging society, where the population growth rate is below the 
interest rate, the best solution should be to curtail the pay-as-you-go SS scheme.  This can 
be confirmed as follows.   
Assuming that the childcare subsidy is set so that (10) holds, the impact of an 
increase in the SS tax on a household’s utility is given by 
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Then if (5) and (9) hold, we can show the relationship such that 
, ~ 0 , ~ 0
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which is positive as far as (9) holds.  Thus, SS reduces social welfare as far as the level of 
SS benefit is below a certain level of  p ~, even with the second-best policy combination. 
Now, consider the impact on fertility.  Assuming that ( )z r w + > 1 , we know from (4) 
that a higher SS tax raises the number of children since   11
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and also that 
           . ~ 1 , ~ 1 p p r n p p r n ‡ ￿ + ‡ < ￿ + <  
Thus the impacts of the SS tax on the household’s utility and number of children are 
illustrated in the left part of Figure 1.  The second-best policy combination cannot revise the 
conventional wisdom that SS reduces social welfare as far as the population growth rate is 
below the interest rate, even if the population growth rate is endogenously determined.  
Also, it is ironic that the level of utility is minimized when the population growth rate reaches 
the interest rate, that is, when the so-called “golden rule” holds. 
If we assume that  ( )z r w + £ 1 , then a higher SS tax reduces both and the 
household’s utility and number of children, as illustrated in the right part of Figure 1.  In this 
case, the population growth rate cannot exceed the interest rate, and the gap between the 
two widens as the government raises the SS tax (and correspondingly, the childcare 
subsidy).   
Thus, in both cases, we confirm that the best solution under an aging population is to 
reduce the size of a pay-as-you-go SS system by lowering the levels of SS tax and benefit.  
The childcare subsidy fails to completely offset the welfare-reducing effect of SS, even if it 
can raise the number of children.  Thus, under an aging population the  best policy 
combination is no SS and no childcare subsidy. 
      
2.4 A closed economy with capital accumulation 
 
Let us move to a closed economy, where non-human capital accumulates through 
household savings, and affects the wage and interest rate.  We continue to assume that   12
each household takes wage, interest rate, and average number of children of other 
households as given and maximizes its utility with no bequests.  Then, the privately optimal 
number of children and the levels of consumption in each period remain the same as in an 
open economy.  In addition, the population growth rate is again below the interest rate, if 
there is no or limited childcare support and (9) holds. 
Now, let us consider capital accumulation explicitly.  In the steady state and Nash 
equilibrium (with  n n = ), per-capita capital stock, k, is given by 





















          (12) 
using (4) and (6) for r earrangement and assuming that capital stock is  completely 
depreciated within one generation. 
Firms act competitively, hiring labor to the point where the marginal product of labor is 
equal to the wage, and renting capital to the point where the marginal product of capital is 
equal to the interest rate.  Also assuming that the production function is constant to scale 
with respect to capital and labor, we know 
           ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) . 0 , 0 , , < ¢ ¢ > ¢ ¢ = ¢ - = k f k f k f r k f k k f w                       (13) 
Then, it is easily shown that from (12) and (13) the introduction of either SS or childcare 
subsidy tends to slow the rate of capital accumulation, since 
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where  . 0 / < = ¢ dk dr r  A higher SS tax and a higher childcare subsidy both reduce the 
household’s savings and in turn reduce the rate of capital accumulation.  This suggests that 
any combination of the two policies cannot offset the negative impact of each policy on 
capital accumulation; rather it may amplify that of each policy.  Hence, the effectiveness of 
the policy combination appears to be much more limited here in a closed economy than in   13
an open economy. 
Then, let us consider the effects of SS and the childcare subsidy on social welfare, 
explicitly considering their impact on capital accumulation.  Our focus is on whether and to 
what extent the childcare subsidy can mitigate the SS’s distorting impact on social welfare.  
Differentiating the household’s indirect utility function, (7), with respect to  p and s, 
respectively, yields 
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where 
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and  . 0 / > = ¢ dk dw w  The first term of the right hand side in (15-1) and (15-2) captures the 
direct impact of the SS tax and childcare subsidy, respectively, on the household’s utility, 
whereas the second term represents their indirect impact on the household’s utility through 
capital accumulation.  W gives the impact of a change in capital stock on the household’s 
utility through wage and interest rate.  With no SS or childcare subsidy,  W is shown to be 
positive: that is; the higher per-capita capital raises the household’s utility.  We cannot 
generally tell the sign of  W, which depends on parameters.  We can show, however, that 
the less the childcare subsidy, the higher becomes the case that  Wis positive and that the 
childcare subsidy reduces utility through capital accumulation. 
It is difficult to algebraically solve the optimal combination of the SS tax and the 
childcare subsidy from (15), but it is interesting to assess the combination of  ( ) r p s + = 1 , 
which is the second-best solution in an open economy, here in a closed economy in terms of   14
efficiency.  First, focus on (15-2) given p and consider whether or not the combination of 
( ) r p s + = 1  remains optimal.   The first term of the right hand side of (15-2) is zero when 
( ) r p s + = 1  and positive (negative) when s is smaller (larger) than  ( ) r p + 1 , as already 
discussed for an open economy.  And, a tedious but simple calculation yields   
           , ~ 0 , ~ 0
) 1 /( ) 1 /( p p if p p if
r p s r p s ‡ £ W < > W
+ = + =  
assuming that the production function is constant to scale and firms act competitively (and 
thus  0 = ¢ + ¢ r k w ).  Considering that  ( ) p p ~ ‡ <   corresponds to  ( ) r n + ‡ < 1 in a closed 
economy as in an open economy, and assuming that  r n + <1 under an aging population, 
we get 









Thus, the combination of  ( ) r p s + = 1  is no longer the second-best solution in a closed 
economy.  Given the level of the SS tax, p, the government should set the level of childcare 
subsidy lower than  ( ) r p + 1 , since the childcare subsidy adds to the SS’s negative impact 
on capital accumulation. 
Furthermore, we cannot a priori rule out the possibility that curtailing the childcare 
subsidy is favorable.  The negative impact of the childcare subsidy on capital accumulation 
might dominate its total impact on the household’s utility, even if its direct impact on the 
household’s utility–which is reflected in the second term of the right hand side of (14-1)–is 
positive.  Section 3 examines this possibility, along with the impact on the number of 
children, based on simple simulations. 
 
2.5 Bequest motive and fertility in an open economy 
 
Let us introduce altruistic bequests into the model and analyze how they affect the   15
previous conclusions, assuming that households care about their future generations as well 
as themselves.  The well-known Barro’s neutrality argues that individuals offset the change 
in public income transfers–such as net contributions of SS–by an offsetting change in 
altruistic bequests, making the net transfers between generations unaffected.  Does this 
argument still hold in this model with endogenous fertility?  That is, are SS and childcare 
subsidy neutral to the household’s utility?  And, is the combination of the SS tax and 
childcare subsidy,  ( ) r p s + = 1 , desirable as in the case of no bequest motive? 
First, let us consider the case of an open economy, where the wage and the interest 
rate are exogenously given and capital accumulation can be neglected.  And, assume that 
the household cares about its children’s welfare by weighting the children’s utility in its own 
utility function, and denote the utility function of the altruistic household as U.  To make the 
calculations simple, set up U as 
, , 0 , 1 , , 0 , 1
,
1
ln ln ln 1 2 1




< < < = + +
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+ + + = + U
n
c c n U
 
where U+1 is the per-capita utility of the children.  e  and  d  are parameters that show the 
degree of altruism in different ways:  e  is the elasticity of altruism toward children with 
respect to the number of children, and  d  is the rate to discount the children’s utility.  The 
number of children affects the household’s utility in two ways: directly (the first term) and 
indirectly by multiplying the child’s utility by
e n  (the fourth term).  Although this seems to be 
partly redundant, we use this model to make the results easy to compare with those in the 
model of no altruism.   
To make the system dynamically stable, we have to assume that  d
e + <1 n  
hereafter.  In addition, assume that the household receives bequests from its parents and 
leaves bequests to its children in the working period, so the budget constraint in each period 
is expressed as   16
( ) ( ) , 1 1 x n s p n b s z b r w c - - - + - - + + = - -                                       (16-1) 
( ) , 1 2 n p x r c + + =                                                                          (16-2) 
where b is per-capita bequests left to the children, b- is bequests left by the parents, and x is 
savings.  Bequests, like savings, bear the interest rate, r, and r- denotes the interest rate on 
the bequests received from the parent generation.  Each household maximizes its utility, U, 
under the above budget constraints, taking wage, interest rate, and number of children of 
other households to be as assumed in the previous subsections.   
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where c1,+1 is the children’s consumption in the working period.  Let us concentrate on a 
Nash equilibrium in the steady state, where  n n = , b-1=b, r-1=r, c1=c1,+1, and c1=c2,+1.  Then, 


















n                                                      (18) 
which  means that in an open economy the number of children depends solely on the 
(world’s) interest rate and the degree of altruism against children
4.  If there is perfect 
arbitrage between human capital and non-human capital, the interest rate can be interpreted 
as a rate of return on human capital.  Then, it makes sense that the higher interest rate 
                                                 
4  This result has already been obtained by Becker and Barro (1988)’s analysis on endogenous fertility.     17
encourages the household to increase the number of children.  The net cost of childcare, 
which reflects SS and childcare support, is neutral to fertility due to the household’s altruistic 
income transfer.  Moreover, if (18) holds, the assumption that  d
e + <1 n  that makes the 
system dynamically stable is transformed to the inequality  r n + <1 . 
     However, the fact that neither SS nor childcare subsidy affects the number of children 
does not necessarily mean that they are neutral to the household’s utility.  This can be 
confirmed as follows.  In a Nash equilibrium in the steady state, the budget constraints of 
the household, (16-1) and (16-2), are aggregated with some rearrangement into   




















1 .                           (16)’ 
This budget constraint (16)’, together with (17-1), (17-3), and (18), y ields the first-order 
solutions for c1, c2, and b to maximize economic welfare, given the number of children, 
which is independently determined by (16), as well as SS benefit and the childcare subsidy.   
This budget constraint (16)’ suggests that a  change in the SS tax is neutral to the 
household’s decisions about the number of children and consumption only if  ( ) p r b D + = D 1 .  
(17-3) tells, however, that if  ( ) p r b D + = D 1 , a change in the SS tax affects the household’s 
behavior unless  ( ) r p s + D = D 1 .  Second, (17-3) suggests that a change in the childcare 
subsidy is neutral to the household’s decisions about the number of children and 
consumption only if  s b D = D .  (16)’ tells, however, that if  s b D = D , a change in the 
childcare subsidy affects the household’s budget constraint unless  ( ) r p s + D = D 1 . 
Therefore, neither SS nor childcare subsidy is neutral to the household’s behavior, 
unless the government sets the policy combination of  ( ) r p s + = 1 .  If  ( ) r p s + = 1 , then 
the household’s bequest function looks like 
             s b
r
p




                                              (19)   18
where  b is a component that is not related to SS and childcare subsidy.  Any change in 
those policies is offset by an opposite change in bequests, and does not affect the levels of 
consumption and utility.  Note, however, that this does not mean the optimality of this policy 
combination. 
The main difference from the case of no altruism is that we cannot rule out the case in 
which a higher SS tax raises social welfare, even if the population growth rate is below the 
interest rate.  Also, the impact of the childcare subsidy is mixed.  These features can be 
confirmed as follows.  First, in the steady state of the model, the level of utility is the same 
for all generations and it is given by 
( )( )
( ) ( )
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using (17-1) and (18).  Second, plugging (20) and the budget constraint (16)’ into (17-3) 
yields 
( ) ( )
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( ) ( )
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The left hand side of this equation represents a net marginal decrease in the household’s 
own utility caused by an increase in the number of children, while the right hand side 
represents a marginal increase in the children’s utility discounted by the household.  Taking 
the special case of  0 = e , differentiating (21) with respect to c1, p, and s yields 
( )
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Hence, if the population growth rate is low enough to meet the condition of  ( ) r n + < 1 a --   19
which is equivalent to the condition of  ( ) 1 1 > +d a  in the case of  0 = e --then a higher SS 
tax would raise the level of consumption and accordingly that of overall social welfare.  The 
number of children is not affected by any policy change, and capital accumulation is 
neglected here in an open economy.   
This conclusion--even if depending on parameters such as  a  and  d --is the 
opposite of the usual conclusion of conventional life-cycle models, which a pay-as-you-go 
SS system reduces welfare if  r n + <1 .  Also, the latter part of (22) implies that an 
increase in the childcare subsidy, albeit likely to mitigate the negative impact of SS on social 
welfare, could lower the level of the household’s consumption and utility if the number of 
children is so small that  ( ) r n + < 1 a . 
The intuitive reason for these paradoxical results is that a higher SS tax raises the net 
cost of childcare, which in turn endows future generations with a higher level of consumption 
and utility, whereas the childcare subsidy reduces the net cost of childcare, which in turn 
reduces consumption and social welfare utility of future generations. It should be noted, 
however, that if the initial number of children is not so small ( ( ) r n + > 1 a ), then the negative 
income effect of a higher SS benefit or a lower childcare subsidy on the household’s income 
dominates the overall impact on consumption and utility.  We also notice from (21) that the 
SS tax and childcare subsidy, if combined so that  ( ) r p s + = 1 , are neutral to social 
welfare. 
 
2.6 Bequest motive and fertility in a closed economy 
 
     Finally, let us move to a closed economy and take capital accumulation into account.  
The budget constraints (16) and the first-order conditions (17) remain the same as in the 
case of an open economy.  We now consider capital accumulation, where per-capita capital   20
stock is determined by savings and bequests such that 
           ( ) ( ) ( )
n
c nz p b r w
b
n
c n b s z ns p b r w
k
1 1 1 1 - - - + +
= +
- + - - - - + +
=  
in the steady state.  It is impossible to algebraically capture the overall impact of SS and 
childcare subsidy, as well as to foretell the direction of a change.   A higher SS tax itself is 
likely to subdue savings under a pay-as-you-go SS system.  At the same time, however, it 
may encourage the household to raise altruistic bequests, because parents get worried 
about heavier burdens levied on their children.  If the latter effect is larger than the former, 
capital accumulation could be stimulated.  And if that is the case, interest rate declines and 
number of children falls (see (18)), thus per-capita capital stock increases further.  On the 
other hand, a higher childcare subsidy is expected to directly encourage the household to 
rear children and lower the pace of capital accumulation.   In any case, however, we cannot 
know the overall impact of each policy on the household’s utility. 
Finally, does the conclusion that the combination of  ( ) r p s + = 1  makes both SS 
and the childcare subsidy neutral to social welfare still hold?  Assuming that the 
government arranges policy so that  ( ) r p s + = 1  and that the household sets up its 
bequests as shown in (19), per-capita capital stock is given by 




c zn b r w
k
- - + +
=                                             (22) 
Thus, both SS and childcare subsidy disappear from all of the budget constraints (16), the 
first-order conditions (17), and capital accumulation (23).  The two policies, if combined as 
( ) r p s + = 1 , do not affect social welfare at all, which again is the same conclusion as that 
drawn from the model of an open economy.   
 




     In this section, we illustrate the impact of SS, childcare subsidy, and their combination 
on social welfare and number of children based on simple simulations.   We compare the 
policy effects for two models (a model with no altruism and a model with altruism) under two 
economies (an open economy and a closed economy), starting with the initial situation 
where a pay-as-you-go SS system has already been incorporated and that total fertility rate 
is relatively low.  Discussions in Section 2 imply that the policy results depend much on the 
setup of the model and the economy: the impact of introducing the childcare subsidy is 
expected to be favorable in a model with no altruism in an open economy, while its direction 
is not determined in other cases.   
     We establish the initial condition by providing parameters with tentative but seemingly 
plausible values, as summarized in Table 1.  For the utility function, the same weight (1/3) 
is put on the number of children and each level of consumption in the working and retired 
periods.  The production function is given by 
q k y = , with the share of capital income,q , 
being equal to 1/3.  The lump-sum SS tax is set at 20% of the initial wage, and the 
childcare subsidy is not introduced initially.  For models with  altruism,  e , one of two 
parameters of altruism, is set to be 0.003.  We find after several trials that a high value of 
e  tends to make the simulations unstable and unlikely to converge. 
Then, the gross cost of childcare, z, is left fixed.  We first set the initial value of n as 
0.8, reflecting the fact that the average TFR is close to 1.6 among major industrialized 
nations.  Then we run simulations and search for the value of z that makes n 0.8; we find 
that z is about 35.8% of the wage.  We assume that z is proportional to the wage (unlike the 
theoretical analysis in Section 2), since it seems reasonable to think that the opportunity   22
cost of childcare depends greatly on wage.  In the case of models with altruism, we further 
need to fixd , another parameter of altruism.  We use the same childcare cost/wage ratio 
(z/w=0.358) as in models with no altruism, and search for the value ofd  that makes n 0.8.  
We find that  d  is 1.827.  
The initial values for endogenous variables, which are to be solved by simulations 
based on the above-mentioned parameters, are reported in Tables 2 and 3 (see below). 
 
3.2 Steady state comparisons 
 
Let us first make steady state comparisons, comparing the long-run impact of policy 
changes with the initial state.  In each model, we consider three policy options: (1) the “CC 
subsidy,” which introduces the childcare subsidy, equivalent to 50% of the SS tax, that is, 
10% of the initial wage; (2) the “SS cut,” which reduces the SS tax (as well as the SS 
benefit) to its half size, that is, 10% of the initial wage, again; and (3) the  “Mix,” which 
combines (1) and (2).  The “Mix” case keeps the total contributions to SS and childcare 
subsidy unchanged, and aims to make the overall system more childcare-friendly.  The “CC 
Subsidy” case aims to assess the second-bestness of childcare support. 
     Tables 2 and 3 summarize the simulation results, with the former for models with no 
altruism and the latter for those with altruism.  To begin with, let us look at the results for the 
most basic model (no altruism/small open) in the top part of Table 2.  The childcare subsidy 
raises the household’s utility, because it increases the number of children and mitigates the 
negative impact of the existing SS, in line with the argument presented in 2.2.  However, 
the improvement of utility is relatively limited, reflecting reduced consumption levels.  
Actually, the optimal level of the childcare subsidy, which corresponds to the second-best 
combination of  ( ) r p s + = 1 , is calculated to be 36.3% of the SS benefit (7.26% of the   23
wage), given that the interest rate is 1.755, which is equivalent to 3.4% at a thirty-year 
composite annual rate.  A reduction in the SS tax becomes more efficient in improving 
welfare, while its impact on fertility is not so strong as in the case of introducing the childcare 
subsidy.   This is also consistent with the argument in 2.3.  The mix of the two policies is 
more efficient in raising fertility, but its impact on utility is less than in the case of reducing 
the SS tax.   
     A closed economy with capital accumulation presents a quite different picture (see the 
bottom part of Figure 2).  First, the childcare subsidy fails to improve the household’s utility, 
although it raises fertility.  As suggested from discussions in 2.4, the explanation lies with 
capital accumulation; per-capita capital stock drops sharply due to an increase in the 
population size, which in turn lowers wage income substantially.  By contrast, curtailing SS 
is welfare-improving, mainly because it stimulates the pace of capital accumulation.  In this 
“SS cut” case, fertility also improves due to an increase in wage income, which in turn helps 
to raise utility.  In the “Mix” case, the impact on welfare lies between the two. 
     Next, let us move to Table 3, where altruistic bequests are incorporated.  In an open 
economy, where wage and interest rate are exogenously given and capital accumulation is 
neglected, both introducing t he childcare subsidy and reducing the SS tax are 
welfare-improving and neutral to fertility (see the top part).  Both of these policies lead to a 
substantial increase in bequests, which finances higher levels of consumption for all 
generations in the steady state.  The  “Mix” case  amplifies the results of the two policies.   
Discussions in 2.5 point to the possibility that both of “CC subsidy” and “SS cut” may reduce 
consumption and utility, but our simulation obtains the opposite results
5.   
                                                 
5  In our simulation,  e  is very close to 0, and 754 . 0 ) 263 . 1 1 ( * 3 / 1 ) 1 ( , 8 . 0 = + = + = r n a .  Hence, 
( ) r n + > 1 a , which probably means that dc1/dp<0 and dc1/ds>0 from (22).  If we start a simulation with a 
much lower number of children, we could have the opposite results as the substitution effect becomes   24
 In a closed economy, models of altruism lead to completely the opposite results: 
introducing childcare subsidy and curtailing SS both hurt social welfare, although they 
succeed in raising fertility (see the bottom part).  The mechanism behind this is such that 
an increase in the number of children reduces per-capita capital stock, which in turn lowers 
wage income and at the same time further raises fertility.  It should be remembered that 
lower per-capital stock increases fertility due to a higher interest rate in the models with 
altruism.  Another noteworthy result is that the household reduces bequests substantially in 
the “SS cut” case, as suggested in 2.6.  This is probably because a lower SS tax, which 
means a lower SS benefit, reduces the burdens on future generations and discourages the 
household from leaving altruistic bequests, and further dampens the pace of capital 
accumulation. 
 
3.3 The transition and policy impact by generation 
 
Steady state comparisons do not complete the assessment of each policy option, 
since any policy reform affects each generation differently during the transition to a new 
steady state.  A well-known example of this is the “double burden” problem in SS reform.  
A shift from a pay-as-you-go system to a funded one requires the current working generation 
to pay “double” SS burdens to finance the benefits for both the current pensioners and 
themselves.  This means that this SS reform makes the future generation better off at the 
expense of the current generation, making it difficult to be politically accepted.  By contrast, 
introduction of the childcare subsidy is not likely to affect each generation so differently.  
This is because childcare subsidy and tax, which are balanced within the same generation, 
                                                                                                                                               
larger than the income effect.   25
cause  intragenerational rather than  intergenerational income redistribution, although the 
impact is expected spill over to subsequent generations through capital accumulation, 
bequests, and fertility. 
Our model is a very simple overlapping generations model, which consists of only two 
generations and two periods, but it can illustrate the basic picture of the transition process, 
as well as the intergenerational distribution of the policy impact.   In simulations, we assume 
for simplicity that the household has static expectations about wage and interest rate, and 
we concentrate on the simulation results in a closed economy.  Policy options to be 
considered are the same as those shown in Tables 2 and 3.  The government announces 
and implements policy changes at the time when generation 1 is in the working period and 
generation 0 is in the retired period.  In the “CC subsidy” case, generations 1 and younger 
receive a subsidy equivalent to p/2 per child and finance it by themselves.  In the “SS cut” 
case, generation 1 pays p in the working period (to finance the SS benefit for generation 0) 
and receives  p/2 times the number of  children per household in the retired period.  
Generations 2 and younger pay p/2 in the working period and receives p/2 times the number 
of children per household in their retired period.  Generation 0, which retired at the time as 
the policy announcement, continue to receive the SS benefit, p, despite the policy change.   
Figures 2 to 4 summarize the results of models with no altruism.  We first find from 
Figure 2 that curtailing the SS makes generation 1 worse off, although it raises utility in the 
long run.  This result corresponds to a so-called “double burden” situation, pointing to a 
difficulty in incorporating SS reform.  By contrast, introduction of the childcare subsidy 
immediately reduces the utility of generation 0 to its steady state level due to a reduction of 
per-capita capital, as its tax and benefit are balanced within that generation.  In the “Mix” 
case, the adverse impact is concentrated heavily on generation 1. 
Figure 3 shows that the pace of improvement in fertility is more moderate during the   26
transition in the “SS cut” case than in the “CC subsidy” case.  This is because generation 1 
needs to save more to offset a reduction in the SS benefit it will receive after retirement, 
reducing income available for bearing children.  Figure 4 compares a change in per-capita 
capital stock and confirms that curtailing SS gradually raises it, whereas introducing the 
childcare subsidy lowers it immediately, in line with the results in Figure 3.   
Turning to models with altruism, we find a more complicated picture of the transition 
as illustrated in Figures 5 to 7.  The  most remarkable difference from models with no 
altruism is that the utility curve becomes bumpier in the “SS cut” case, with generation 1 
being worse off, generations 2 and 3 being better off, and generation 4 and younger being 
worse off.  A reduction of per-capita capital stock dominates social welfare in the long run, 
but the transitory generations are more exposed to the short-run impact: generation 1 faces 
a “double burden” problem and generation 2 enjoys a reduction in net SS contributions, both 
in line with the results for an open economy.  Generation 3 seems to be able to enjoy the 
spillover effect from its parent g eneration.  However, for generation 4 and beyond, a 
reduction in per-capita income dominates the net impact on the household’s utility, as 
suggested in Figures 6 and 7.  Figure 7 suggests that generation 1 increases savings for 
their own incomes after retirement, but that smaller SS discourages altruistic bequests, 
which together with an increase in population lowers the pace of per-capita capital 
accumulation.  In the “CC subsidy” case, the transition is more gradual than in the “SS cut” 
case and it takes several generations to reach to a new steady state. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
     Our analysis shows that the impact of SS reform and childcare support on fertility and 
social welfare depends much on the setup of models and assumptions about the openness   27
of the economy and altruism.  The main results are summarized as follows. 
Assuming no altruism in an open economy where wage and interest rate are given 
exogenously, introduction of a childcare subsidy is a second-best solution that offsets the 
SS’s distorting effect on resource allocation under an aging population.  If we move to a 
closed economy and/or assume altruistic bequests, however, childcare support is not 
necessarily desirable.  And, we cannot rule out the case that even curtailing SS, which is 
the  best solution in an open economy with no altruism, fails to improve social welfare.  
Meanwhile, both introducing the childcare subsidy and reducing the SS tax are expected to 
raise fertility (except for the case of an open economy with altruism), but their impact on 
capital accumulation and the household’s altruistic behavior make it difficult to foretell the 
direction of the policy impact.  We also find that SS reform and childcare support affect the 
transition process to the new steady state differently.   SS reform, which affects 
intergenerational income transfer, tends to make the directions of long-term and short-term 
policy impacts opposite.  By contrast, childcare  support does not, since the childcare 
subsidy is financed within the same generation. 
These results are likely to hold for wider definitions of SS (including any policy that 
requires income transfer to the elderly from the young, such as health and nursing care for 
the elderly) and of childcare support (including any policy that helps rearing  the future 
generations, such as financial aid for education).  However, our analysis is based on a very 
simple overlapping generations model, and there remains much to be investigated.  Most 
of all, it is interesting to know how childcare support, which aims just to raise fertility in our 
analysis, can improve labor productivity and at least partly offset the adverse effect of a 
larger population on per-capita income.  Childcare support could be more 
welfare-improving than implied in this paper. 
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Note:  The initial vaules of 菂and z/w are solved to make n equal to 0.8.Table 2:  Models of no altrusim:  steady state comparisons  
 
Variables s p 2n k w r c 1 c 2 u
Initial values 0.000 0.058 1.600 0.083 0.291 1.755 0.083 0.229 -1.395
Open economy
   CC subsidy 0.029 0.058 2.000 - 0.291 1.755 0.075 0.206 -1.391
   SS cut 0.000 0.029 1.737 - 0.291 1.755 0.090 0.249 -1.313
   Mix 0.029 0.029 2.152 - 0.291 1.755 0.081 0.222 -1.317
Closed economy
   CC subsidy 0.029 0.058 1.978 0.035 0.217 3.143 0.048 0.199 -1.554
   SS cut 0.000 0.029 1.749 0.099 0.308 1.559 0.096 0.247 -1.291
   Mix 0.029 0.029 2.198 0.051 0.247 2.433 0.065 0.223 -1.379
Note: "CC subsidy"introduces the childcare subsidy, which is equivalent to 50% of the SS tax (10% of initial w); 
           "SS Cut" reduces the SS tax to its half size (10% of initial w); and "Mix" does both of them.
 In an open economy, per-capita capital stock is assumed to be fixed.Table 3:  Models of altrusim:  steady state comparisons
Variables s p 2n k w r c 1 c 2 b U
Initial values 0.000 0.068 1.600 0.136 0.342 1.263 0.116 0.262 0.021 -1.918
Open economy
   CC subsidy 0.034 0.068 1.600 - 0.342 1.263 0.407 0.922 0.420 -0.620
   SS cut 0.000 0.034 1.600 - 0.342 1.263 0.243 0.550 0.180 -1.152
   Mix 0.034 0.034 1.600 - 0.342 1.263 0.539 1.221 0.585 -0.330
Closed economy
   CC subsidy 0.034 0.068 1.996 0.078 0.285 1.821 0.085 0.240 0.017 -2.006
   SS cut 0.000 0.034 1.724 0.112 0.321 1.438 0.104 0.253 0.005 -1.952
   Mix 0.034 0.034 2.238 0.061 0.262 2.163 0.073 0.232 0.006 -2.043
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